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THE ROAD TO THE FUTURE: A REGULATORY REGIME
FOR THE RISE OF THE ROBOT CARS
DANIEL SPENCER*
INTRODUCTION
An Apple iCar™, a Tesla X, and a Google Waymo all meet up at a
three-way intersection. Who has the right of way? Is the concept of a “right
of way” even applicable when each car has already wirelessly transmit-
ted its intended route and collectively planned for this intersection five
miles ago?1
As autonomous vehicles slowly revolutionize America’s roadways,
the underlying expectations and regulations must change also.2 To date,
these changes have been largely uncoordinated and inconsistent across
the states.3 Purportedly to remedy this inconsistency, the U.S. Department
of Transportation (“USDOT”) has appointed numerous task forces within
the Federal Highway Administration, the National Highway Traffic Safety
Administration (“NHTSA”), the Federal Transit Administration, and else-
where, but has yet to issue binding requirements.4 The closest the USDOT
has come to doing so is its September 12, 2017 publication Automated
Driving Systems: A Vision for Safety suggesting industry best practices
* JD Candidate, William & Mary Law School, 2018; BA Business Administration and
Finance, Point Loma Nazarene University, 2013, summa cum laude. The author would
like to thank the staff of the William & Mary Environmental Law and Policy Review for
their collective efforts on this Note. The author also expresses sincere gratitude to his
family, parents, and Professor Fred Lederer for their selfless support and encouragement.
1 See Andrew Ng & Yuanqing Lin, Self-Driving Cars Won’t Work Until We Change Our
Roads—And Attitudes, WIRED MAGAZINE (Mar. 15, 2016) (“[W]e should not expect com-
puters to drive in the same way as humans.”).
2 See id. (comparing the development of social expectations during the emergence of the
railroad to social expectations during the emergence of autonomous vehicles).
3 See NAT’L CONF. OF STATE LEGIS., Autonomous Self-Driving Vehicles Legislation (Nov. 11,
2016), http://www.ncsl.org/research/transportation/autonomous-vehicles-legislation.aspx
[https://perma.cc/YD2X-4CS3] (comparing the states’ differing approaches to autonomous
vehicle legislation).
4 See Carl Andersen, USDOT Activities in Automation, SIS49: National Road Authorities
Strategies to Support the Development towards Automation, 22ND ITS WORLD CONFERENCE
(2015), http://www.its.dot.gov/presentations/world_congress2015/wc2015_Automation.pdf
[https://perma.cc/VQK9-GDJM] (explaining the DOT Intelligent Transportation Systems
Joint Program Office role in integrating efforts across numerous agencies and departments).
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and recommending model legislation.5 However, this effort falls far short
of creating binding standards as NHTSA has done in other areas.6 Ab-
sent binding government regulation, competing and contradicting state
standards stifle innovation.7 In collaboration with the automotive indus-
try, the USDOT should standardize a binding vehicle communication pro-
tocol and promulgate a federally standardized autonomous vehicle code
that is tied to state highway funding.
This Note will begin by assessing the harms and benefits of autono-
mous vehicle proliferation to identify the tradeoffs between negative ex-
ternalities and social utility.8 Where these tradeoffs are large, regulation
becomes particularly appropriate.9 After identifying potential problem areas,
this Note will then examine potential regulatory responses to those problem
areas under three alternative models of regulation: industry-driven, govern-
ment-driven, or a hybrid model.10 Throughout, the emergent technology of
vehicle-to-infrastructure (“V2I”) and vehicle-to-vehicle (“V2V”) communica-
tion protocols will serve as exemplar technologies illustrating the harms of
failing to pre-emptively consider this emergent industry’s regulatory needs.
Ultimately, a case will be made for a comprehensive federal regulatory re-
gime inspired by industry leaders and enforced uniformly by the states.
5 See generally Automated Driving Systems: A Vision for Safety, NHTSA (2017), https://
www.nhtsa.gov/sites/nhtsa.dot.gov/files/documents/13069a-ads2.0_090617_v9a_tag.pdf
[https://perma.cc/8LQ6-RLNZ] (characterizing the publication as “Voluntary Guidance”
intended to promote the use of “best practices”).
6 Compare id. and 49 C.F.R. §§ 563.1, 563.6 (2006) (requiring data recorders in all ve-
hicles, mandating commercial availability of data recording tools, and allowing for almost
no exceptions). 
7 This is demonstrably true for the healthcare and construction industries. See, e.g., David
M. Gann et al., Do Regulations Encourage Innovation?—the Case of Energy Efficiency in
Housing, BLDG. RES. AND INFO., 284, 293–94 (Oct. 2010) (comparing “prescriptive” and
“performance-based” regulation and advocating for the latter due to its enhanced “infor-
mation sharing and co-operation” amongst regulators); see also Lesley H. Curtis & Kevin
A. Schulman, Overregulation of Health Care: Musings on Disruptive Innovation Theory,
69 L. AND CONTEMP. PROBS. 195, 196 (2006) (“Rules designed to protect consumers may
have the unintended consequence of preventing good-quality, lower-cost alternatives from
reaching the marketplace.”).
8 See R.H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1, 2 (1960) (establishing a
general framework for analyzing risk-utility tradeoffs in emergent markets, using the
telecom industry as an example).
9 Id. (claiming that regulatory intervention requires analyzing social utility vs. risk “in
total and at the margin”).
10 INTELLIGENT TRANSP. SYS. JOINT PROGRAM OFFICE & U.S. DEP’T OF TRANSP. RESEARCH
AND INNOVATIVE TECH. ADMIN., CONNECTED VEHICLE ENVIRONMENT: GOVERNANCE
ROUNDTABLE PROCEEDINGS FROM JUNE 20, 2011, 196–204 [hereinafter INTELLIGENT
TRANSP. SYS.] (identifying the three potential governance models).
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I. THE GENERAL SOCIAL IMPORTANCE OF REGULATING
AUTONOMOUS VEHICLES
Whoever owns the means of production at the time an innovation
occurs usually captures the majority of the benefits created by that
innovation.11 For instance, factory owners rather than factory workers prof-
ited from proliferation of industrial robots throughout the 1990s.12 Look-
ing deeper into history, print shops profited from the printing press to
the detriment of their now-obsolete typesetters.13 In the future, transpor-
tation and shipping companies will capture the benefits of autonomous ve-
hicles at the expense of drivers’ obsolescence.14 When autonomous vehicles
increase wage inequality and unemployment without a countervailing
benefit, they operate to the detriment of now-obsolete drivers.15 Regula-
tions on the use of autonomous vehicles will determine a new allocation
of benefits between the truck owner, the now-unemployed driver, and the
truck manufacturer. The decisions (or indecision) of our regulators will
permanently change the contours of the transportation industry by re-
apportioning its fruits amongst the industry’s participants.
Such benefit-shifting applies to the consumer use of autonomous
vehicles as well. Driverless cars do not benefit the consumer transportation
industry if the law forces them to operate within the same regulatory
environment and the same set of societal expectations as human-piloted
11 See, e.g., Sebastian Moffett, Technology Widens the Gap Between Rich and Poor, WALL
ST J. (May 4, 2011), https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052748703922804576301
154008155570 [https://web.archive.org/web/*/https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB100014240
52748703922804576301154008155570] (relying on an OECD report to identify techno-
logical progress as a contributing factor in growing wage inequality).
12 See DR. MICHAEL J. HICKS & SRIKANT DEVARAJ, THE MYTH AND THE REALITY OF
MANUFACTURING IN AMERICA AT TABLE 4, BALL STATE UNIVERSITY CENTER FOR BUSINESS
AND ECONOMIC RESEARCH DATA CENTER (2015), http://projects.cberdata.org/reports/Mfg
Reality.pdf [https://perma.cc/7R9P-GRLM] (attributing 87% of manufacturing job loss to
automation); see also Patrick Gillespie, Rise of the machines: Fear robots, not China or
Mexico, CNN MONEY (Jan. 30, 2017), http://money.cnn.com/2017/01/30/news/economy
/jobs-china-mexico-automation/index.html [https://perma.cc/FWV4-3TRY].
13 See, e.g., Tom Scocca, The first printed books came with a question: What do you do with
these things?, BOSTON GLOBE (Aug. 29, 2010), http://archive.boston.com/bostonglobe/ideas
/articles/2010/08/29/cover_story/ [https://perma.cc/B763-RA4A] (examining the effect of
the printing press on the emerging market for books).
14 U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, INDUSTRIES AT A GLANCE: TRUCK
TRANSPORTATION, NAICS-484 (2016), http://www.bls.gov/iag/tgs/iag484.htm [https://per
ma.cc/WVR3-CMSW] (counting nearly 1.5 million Americans employed as full-time truck
drivers, more than one percent of the U.S. labor force).
15 Moffett, supra note 11.
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cars.16 For example, a driverless car is in fact not a driverless car at all
if regulations require an attentive driver to have her hands on the wheel
at all times.17 In addition to this regulation, numerous other rules have
crept in to sponge up the benefits of driverless cars and erode consumer
demand, including heightened insurance requirements, use restrictions,
special speed limits, and other unique requirements.18 Indeed, it is in the
best interest of both the insurance industry19 and the petroleum
industry20 that driverless cars do not become mainstream, and if they do,
that they gain popularity slowly and under strict regulation.21 With the
proper amount and type of regulation, driverless cars can completely re-
define transportation as we know it today, or they can remain mired in
regulatory red tape.
It is important that any regulation seek to enable safety and in-
novation, not stifle ingenuity to further the status quo for the benefit of
those with a financial interest in “business as usual.”22 At some point, com-
pliance with special regulations so erodes the benefits of the innovation
that the only remaining benefits accrue to special use cases,23 or to the
manufacturers of the vehicles, rather than to the end user.24
16 Ng & Lin, supra note 1.
17 NAT’L CONF. OF STATE LEGIS., supra note 3 (conducting a fifty-state survey and finding
that most states have “hands-on” requirements for autonomous vehicle drivers).
18 Id. (identifying state-by-state use restrictions on autonomous vehicles).
19 INS. INFO. INST., Background On: Self-Driving Cars and Insurance (July 1, 2016), http://
www.iii.org/issue-update/self-driving-cars-and-insurance [https://perma.cc/82WC-P339]
(explaining the uncertain future of the insurance industry pending the potential emer-
gence of a no-fault compensation fund, and indicating potential market shrinkage due to
the increased sharing of autonomous vehicles).
20 See, e.g., Maria Ramos, How Driverless Cars Will Upend Energy Markets, OIL PRICE
(June 19, 2015), http://oilprice.com/Energy/Energy-General/How-Driverless-Cars-Will-Up
end-Energy-Markets.html [https://perma.cc/FP6F-NPNJ] (“[T]hese driverless cars, when
they do arrive, will change our relationship with fossil fuels forever.”).
21 The growing regulatory restraints and political pressures threatening to suffocate develop-
ment of autonomous vehicles unsurprisingly mirrors the near death of the electric car in the
mid-1990s. See WHO KILLED THE ELECTRIC CAR? (Sony Pictures 2006) (blaming General
Motors and oil companies for delaying the widespread acceptance of electric vehicles).
22 Tim Hindle, Barriers to entry, exit, and mobility, THE ECONOMIST (June 13, 2009), http:
//www.economist.com/node/14025576 [https://perma.cc/BQ4Q-7YSC] (cautioning that
“[b]arriers to entry can also be erected by governments,” to gain a competitive advantage
against prospective market entrants).
23 See id.; see also Olivia Solon, Self-driving trucks: what’s the future for America’s 3.5 million
truckers?, THE GUARDIAN (June 17, 2016), https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2016
/jun/17/self-driving-trucks-impact-on-drivers-us [https://perma.cc/9PYB-42ZX] (such as
taxis and trucking companies that can organize and lobby for commercial-use exemptions
from driving restrictions).
24 But see Anthony Levandowski & Travis Kalaick, Pittsburgh, your Self-Driving Uber is
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This fledgling industry currently has few standards or expecta-
tions surrounding it, making regulations especially powerful. Regulators
have a unique opportunity to both maximize as well as distribute the ben-
efits of autonomous vehicles if they act quickly. NHTSA’s current inac-
tion attains neither of these desirable policy goals.
II. IDENTIFYING THE END-STATE GOAL
Automated braking, acceleration, and blind spot detection have
become more popular since the time of writing.25 Current autonomous ve-
hicle use is limited to research and development by companies that hope to
create the future of driverless cars.26 As such, autonomous vehicles have
only a pending benefit to the average consumer, and the benefit currently
accrues only to the projected future profits of auto manufacturers—it has
not yet arrived.27 As automakers begin to monetize the results of their re-
search and design efforts, it is the duty of the government to draw the line
between safety, profit, and user experience.28 Throughout the past century
of automobile use in the U.S., a complex patchwork of state-by-state vehicle
codes have emerged that draws the risk-utility balancing line in various
places.29 Some states’ regulators prefer to prioritize speed and convenience
arriving now, UBER BLOG (Sept. 14, 2016), https://newsroom.uber.com/pittsburgh-self
-driving-uber/ [https://web.archive.org/web/20171116080053/https://www.uber.com/blog
/pittsburgh/pittsburgh-self-driving-uber/] (claiming self-driving cars will create jobs
rather than destroy them because “self-Driving Ubers will be on the road 24 hours a
day[,]” which means they will need more human maintenance).
25 See Automated Driving Systems: A Vision for Safety, supra note 5, at ii, 4 (explaining
the Society of Automotive Engineers’ definition of “automated vehicle” as only those in
categories 3–5 that do not require extensive human input).
26 While it is true that Uber recently deployed an autonomous fleet, local regulations still
require an attentive driver at all times and the project remains a research and develop-
ment effort. See Max Chafkin, Uber’s First Self-Driving Fleet Arrives in Pittsburgh This
Month, BLOOMBERG (Aug. 18. 2016), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/features/2016-08
-18/uber-s-first-self-driving-fleet-arrives-in-pittsburgh-this-month-is06r7on [https://perma
.cc/PA7Z-5MWZ].
27 See Joan Schneider & Julie Hall, Why Most Product Launches Fail, HARV. BUS. REV.
(Apr. 2011) (examining common failure modes preventing companies from monetizing
research and design assets).
28 U.S. DEP’T OF TRANSP., ABOUT US: MISSION (2015), https://www.transportation.gov/mis
sion/about-us [https://perma.cc/KHM8-5TBY] (“ensuring a fast, safe, efficient, accessible
and convenient transportation system”).
29 See, e.g., CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION, PRIMARY ENFORCEMENT OF
SEAT BELT LAWS, Table B.5 (Dec. 2, 2015), https://www.cdc.gov/motorvehiclesafety/calcu
lator/factsheet/seatbelt.html [https://perma.cc/FR2L-XD32] (detailing the large discrep-
ancies in seatbelt laws across the United States).
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in exchange for astronomical vehicle casualty rates, while other states’
regulators arguably overprotect and inconvenience their drivers.30
The emergence of autonomous vehicles will upset the risk-utility
balance in all fifty states and provide a ripe opportunity for the federal
government to standardize one approach across all the states. Absent fed-
eral government intervention to change the status quo, the regulatory
regime surrounding automobile use is ill-suited to this emergent innova-
tion, and will fail to maximize the benefit of autonomous vehicles.31
A. Maximizing Benefit in the End-State Goal
An attempt to maximize the social utility of this emerging tech-
nology must first identify the utility to be maximized. Clearly understand-
ing the gains to be made ensures that an attempt at regulation (1) does
not stifle the main purpose of the innovation, and (2) does not unduly pri-
oritize special interests.32 The benefits of autonomous vehicles are numer-
ous, but they generally fall into one of three categories: safety, convenience,
or economics.
Even the most basic driver assistance technologies dramatically
improve safety.33 A simple blinking light and alarm combination to warn
of rapidly approaching traffic reduces collisions by an average of seven
percent, and an automatic braking system reduces collisions by fifteen
percent.34 The NHTSA recorded 33,000 fatalities on America’s roadways
last year—more deaths than by suicide, by gun violence, or by drug addic-
tion in the United States.35 Even a nominal increase in roadway safety
30 See, e.g., Tyler Spraul, Worst Drivers by State, CAR INSURANCE COMPARISON (last visited
Jan. 21, 2018), http://www.carinsurancecomparison.com/which-states-have-the-worst-driv
ers/#Table2015 [https://perma.cc/6PWM-RELT] (using National Highway Traffic Safety
Administration crash data to extrapolate the relative safety of driving in each state and
identify outliers).
31 Ng & Lin, supra note 1.
32 Adam Thierer, Why Permissionless Innovation Matters, TECHNOLOGY LIBERATION FRONT
(Apr. 4, 2014) (arguing that “experimentation with new technologies and business models
should generally be permitted by default” if they are not seriously harmful); see also
Adam Thierer, Removing Roadblocks to Intelligent Vehicles and Driverless Cars, 5 WAKE
FOREST J.L. & POL’Y 339, 340 (2015) (arguing for general regulatory permissiveness in
innovating driverless vehicle solutions).
33 Avoiding crashes with self-driving cars, CONSUMER REPORTS (Feb. 2014), http://www
.consumerreports.org/cro/magazine/2014/04/the-road-to-self-driving-cars/index.htm
[https://perma.cc/X75Z-WXLF] (last visited Jan. 21, 2018).
34 Id.
35 NAT’L HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMIN., DOT-HS-812-014, VEHICLE-TO-VEHICLE
COMMUNICATIONS: READINESS OF V2V TECHNOLOGY FOR APPLICATION 263 (2014).
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has a massive impact on lives saved over the course of the 1.2 billion ve-
hicle trips made daily in the U.S.36 Tesla Automotive CEO Elon Musk be-
lieves driverless vehicles are “ten times safer than manual driving.”37 There
are massive gains to be made in automobile safety, and every day the gov-
ernment delays the mass-market adoption of autonomous vehicles di-
rectly correlates with preventable loss of life.38
Although safety is perhaps the largest benefit of autonomous ve-
hicles, their development also promises countless benefits for conve-
nience and economic growth of cities. City planners and urban designers
have already recognized that driverless cars will “change the way we
[would] think about engineering cities,” allowing for a densely packed
city center with minimal parking, smaller roads, and more pedestrian
footpaths.39 Once vehicles can drop off a passenger and then self-park
while empty, the proximity of parking lots no longer matters—they can
be moved to outside the city or into a surrounding industrial area.40 Fur-
ther, due to their precision driving, autonomous vehicles can also pack
more efficiently into a given amount of parking space.41 In fact, autono-
mous vehicles allow for up to a sixty-two percent reduction in the amount
of space required for a given number of cars.42
These changes are already in motion.43 Columbus, Ohio recently
received a forty-million-dollar grant to redesign the city to accommodate
36 U.S. DEP’T OF TRANSP.: BUREAU OF TRANSP. STATISTICS, NATIONAL HOUSEHOLD TRAVEL
SURVEY DAILY TRAVEL QUICK FACTS, https://www.rita.dot.gov/bts/sites/rita.dot.gov.bts
/files/subject_areas/national_household_travel_survey/daily_travel.html [https://perma.cc
/4JD2-NKNW] (last visited Jan. 21, 2018).
37 Cadie Thompson, Elon Musk has finally revealed the second part of Tesla’s ‘top secret’
master plan—here it is, BUSINESS INSIDER (July 20, 2016), http://www.businessinsider
.com/elon-musk-reveals-tesla-masterplan-2016-7 [https://perma.cc/Y3XB-WA8Y].
38 See Bec Crew, Driverless Cars Could Reduce Traffic Fatalities by Up to 90%, Says Re-
port, SCIENCE ALERT (Oct. 1, 2015), https://www.sciencealert.com/driverless-cars-could-re
duce-traffic-fatalities-by-up-to-90-says-report [https://perma.cc/35TS-EFPT].
39 Danielle Muoio, 4 ways driverless cars will change how we live, BUSINESS INSIDER
(Aug. 10, 2016), http://www.businessinsider.com/peter-diamandis-how-driverless-cars-will
-change-how-we-live-2016-8/#tech-companies-may-play-a-bigger-role-in-the-car-industry
-than-traditional-automakers-2 [https://perma.cc/6P4R-GM8F].
40 Doug Newcomb, How Driverless Cars Spell the End of Parking as We Know It, PC MAG-
AZINE (Aug. 12, 2016), https://www.pcmag.com/commentary/346952/how-driverless-cars
-spell-the-end-of-parking-as-we-know-it [https://web.archive.org/web/*/https://www.pcmag
.com/commentary/346952/how-driverless-cars-spell-the-end-of-parking-as-we-know-it].
41 Id.
42 Id.
43 Danielle Muoio & Sky Guold, 9 awesome innovations coming to the very first smart city
in the US, BUSINESS INSIDER (July 11, 2016), http://www.businessinsider.com/closer-look
-at-columbus-ohio-smart-city-2016-7 [https://perma.cc/59GE-DDVK].
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driverless vehicles, and has done so by relocating parking lots and re-
examining its pedestrian routes.44 In a city environment, where cars are
parked for more than ninety-five percent of the time,45 a car-sharing pro-
gram could reduce the number of cars needed to support a city by up to
ninety-five percent.46 With mass-market usage of driverless cars, popula-
tion densities may safely increase, prime real estate previously relegated
to parking spaces may become available for development, and the aver-
age cost of car ownership may decrease by more than ninety percent.47 If
regulation does not allow for these benefits to develop and accrue to the
public at large, it decreases the demand for a driverless future and thus
decreases the chances of that future becoming reality.
B. Minimizing Risk in the End-State Goal
While maximizing these benefits, a well-calibrated regulatory ap-
proach would also identify and minimize the associated harms. Disre-
garding the risks inherent in vehicles generally, driverless vehicles pose
two additional threats: technology failure and human error.48 The
USDOT further classifies the human error component with three failure
modes: “dependency, complacency, and over-reliance.”49 A lengthy USDOT
study found that more than half of drivers feel that even minimally as-
sistive driving technology would cause them to “pay less attention to the
driving environment.”50
44 Id.
45 David Z. Morris, Today’s Cars are Parked 95% of the Time, FORTUNE MAG. (Mar. 13,
2016), http://fortune.com/2016/03/13/cars-parked-95-percent-of-time/ [https://perma.cc
/MVC6-U238].
46 Russ Mitchell & Tracy Lien, Uber is about to start giving rides in self-driving cars, LA
TIMES (Aug. 18, 2016), http://www.latimes.com/business/la-fi-uber-self-driving-cars-201608
18-snap-story.html [https://perma.cc/PQ3A-8T83]; see also Cadie Thompson, Elon Musk
wants to let Tesla owners make money off their cars when they’re not using them, BUSINESS
INSIDER (July 21, 2016), http://www.businessinsider.com/elon-musk-reveals-tesla-shared
-fleet-2016-7 [https://perma.cc/39LY-KDFU]; Paul Barter, “Cars are parked 95% of the time.”
Let’s check!, REINVENTING PARKING (Feb. 22, 2013), http://www.reinventingparking.org/2013
/02/cars-are-parked-95-of-time-lets-check.html [https://perma.cc/4WF7-C3XS].
47 See Newcomb, supra note 40; see also Morris, supra note 45.
48 See Mark Harris, Google reports self-driving car mistakes: 272 failures and 13 near
misses, THE GUARDIAN (Jan. 12, 2016), https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2016/jan
/12/google-self-driving-cars-mistakes-data-reports/ [https://perma.cc/Z8R5-VAS8].
49 NAT’L HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMIN., supra note 35, at 140.
50 Id.
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In addition to the human risks, driverless cars also pose a morass
of potential technological failure modes.51 Any modification to a vehicle in-
troduces a potential new point of failure, and the changes required to make
a vehicle autonomous are numerous.52 Fortunately, the looming threat
of moral, legal, and market sanctions that society will levy against the
first automotive company at fault in a crash substantially mitigates this
technology risk.53 For example, after more than two million miles of test-
ing, only one car in Google’s entire autonomous fleet of vehicles has caused
an accident.54 The incident report indicates that a Google vehicle moving
two miles per hour entered the travel path of a bus and was rear ended
at less than fifteen miles per hour.55 Nonetheless, the incident sparked
public concern and started a media uproar, forecasting severe market sanc-
tions for the first negligent car developer that injures a consumer.56
Some model vehicle codes further mitigate the technology risk by
requiring a “showing” of capabilities before certifying vehicles as road-
worthy.57 Google’s self-driving car has already inspired technological confi-
dence by driving more than two million miles without significant incident.58
In sum, although new technology risks may emerge, regulation and the
hesitancy of the market tend to minimize them.59 The most disconcerting
drawbacks emerge when considering the human element, which proves
more difficult to regulate away.
51 See, e.g., RICKY SALGADO & EMILIANO VELAZQUEZ, TOPOLOGICAL COMPLEXITY FOR DRIVER-
LESS VEHICLES 333 (2016) (analyzing the immense complexity in mapping even a simple
route, and attempting to calculate the number of computer instructions needed to do so).
52 Don Sherman, Semi-Autonomous Cars Compared! Tesla Model S vs. BMW 750i,
Infiniti Q50S, and Mercedes-Benz S65 AMG, CAR AND DRIVER (Feb. 2016), http://www.car
anddriver.com/features/semi-autonomous-cars-compared-tesla-vs-bmw-mercedes-and-infiniti
-feature [https://perma.cc/9HQ9-SW6L] (identifying differences and points of potential failure
in autonomous and regular vehicles, including “loading $60,000 worth of navigation gear, two
powerful electric motors, and shrewd software” into an otherwise everyday car).
53 See Alex Davies, Google’s Self-Driving Car Caused Its First Crash, WIRED MAGAZINE
(Feb. 29, 2016), https://www.wired.com/2016/02/googles-self-driving-car-may-caused-first
-crash/ [https://perma.cc/9HRL-2LKP].
54 Id.; Johana Bhuiyan, After two million miles, Google’s robot car now drives better than
a 16-year-old, RECODE (Oct. 5, 2016), http://www.recode.net/2016/10/5/13167364/google
-self-drivingcars-2-million-miles [https://perma.cc/UA6U-HCLR].
55 Davies, supra note 53.
56 See id.
57 See, e.g., NEV. ADMIN. CODE § 482A.110(3)(b) (2014) (requiring all autonomous vehicle
operators to certify the vehicle has been driven safely for “not less than 10,000 miles in
autonomous mode”).
58 Bhuiyan, supra note 54.
59 See NEV. ADMIN. CODE § 482A.110(3)(b) (2014); Davies, supra note 53.
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C. Balancing Risks Against Benefits in the End-State Goal
Regulators can best optimize the utility of this new technology
through some combination of maximizing upsides while minimizing
downsides.60 The proper balance of risk to reward in this arena will nec-
essarily conform to the standard risk assessment palette used by the in-
surance industry,61 commonly known as the “Risk Cube.” In the Cube
model, an actor has four options when confronting a risk: accept, reject,
mitigate, or transfer the risk.62 The current regulatory regime relies un-
duly on the “reject” and “transfer” corners of the cube.63 Twenty-one states
allow the lawful use of driverless cars on public roads, while the remain-
ing twenty-nine outright “reject” their implementation and development.64
Of the twenty-one that do allow the use of driverless cars, nine of them
only allow such use for testing purposes by authorized entities, or under
other use restrictions—functionally “rejecting” the risk.65 The remaining
twelve states stray away from the “reject” strategy by relying heavily on
the “transfer” approach—requiring much higher insurance than that re-
quired of equivalent human-piloted cars.66 Several of these twelve states,
such as Alabama, Arizona, and Wisconsin, transfer the risk into the fu-
ture by setting up committees to study the risk, or by making narrow ex-
ceptions to existing rules rather than enacting comprehensive legislation.67
In tilting the cube, the “accept” and “mitigate” vertices accelerate
innovation while increasing risk, and the “reject” and “transfer” corners
decelerate innovation while shifting risk to other sectors.68 In placing their
dollars in varying proportions on this risk mitigation cube, each state
inevitably tilts the playing field toward the consumer, toward the indus-
try, or toward the status quo.
An inconsistent tilt of the risk cube across the states will stifle in-
novation. A software programmer in Palo Alto, California, cannot properly
60 Coase, supra note 8.
61 Norman T. Sheehan, A Risk Based Approach to Strategy Execution, 31 J. BUS. STRATEGY
25, 25 (2010) (summarizing the industry standard “Four-step framework to risk-based
strategy exection”).
62 Id.; See DEP’T OF DEFENSE, RISK MANAGEMENT GUIDE FOR DEFENSE ACQUISITION
PROGRAMS, OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR SYST. ENG’G 85
(7th Ed. Dec. 2014) (Interim Release).
63 NAT’L CONF. OF STATE LEGIS., supra note 3.
64 Id.
65 Id.
66 Id.
67 Id.
68 DEP’T OF DEFENSE, supra note 62.
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optimize her code for the regulatory needs of fifty different regimes all tilted
to favor slightly different interests. For example, one state may prefer to
prioritize emissions reduction, and in so doing, incentivize close following
distances to reduce drag.69 Meanwhile, another state may prefer to priori-
tize safety, and in so doing, incentivize increased following distances.70 For
legitimate policy reasons, two states can call for completely opposite vehicle
protocols.71 These mismatched incentives lead to inconsistent autonomous
vehicle behavior, and even worse, they stall development and optimization.
This type of regulatory inconsistency across the states has already
infiltrated other vehicle code provisions as well. As one example among
many, California’s stringent emissions systems requirements render many
cars “49-state” cars that are not eligible for registration in California.72
Like the inconsistent emergence of seatbelt laws,73 and like Florida and
Nevada’s already-differing approaches to regulation,74 the growth of auton-
omous vehicles will create competing incentives that conceal priorities. It
is precisely this misbalance and inconsistency that so interferes with in-
novation as to require centralized, federal action.
III. COMMUNICATION PROTOCOLS AS A MICROCOSM OF THE
END-STATE GOAL
After establishing the nationwide risks and benefits in this emer-
gent industry and prioritizing them along a risk continuum based on the
risk cube, federal regulators must assess the tools with which they can
reach down to the local level to mold the desired outcome.75
Federal regulators shoulder a weighty task in assessing nationwide
risk and implementing policy controls on such a large scale. A smaller-scale
69 Clara Moskowitz, Hypermiling: Driving Tricks Stretch Miles Per Gallon, LIVESCIENCE
(July 24, 2017) (extolling the aerodynamic efficiency benefits of close following distances).
70 TRAVELERS INSURANCE, 3-Second Rule for Safe Following Distance, https://www.trav
elers.com/resources/auto/travel/3-second-rule-for-safe-following-distance.aspx [https://per
ma.cc/5R4U-AKQK] (last visited Jan. 21, 2018) (extolling the safety benefits of large
following distances).
71 Compare Moskowitz ,supra note 69, and TRAVELERS INSURANCE, supra note 70.
72 CAL. DEP’T OF MOTOR VEHICLES, BUYING AND SELLING: FAQS IN CALIFORNIA, http://www
.dmv.org/ca-california/buy-sell/buying-selling-faqs.php [https://perma.cc/9SCK-RT5J] (last
visited Jan. 21, 2018) (“Many vehicles are only certified to meet lesser federal emission
standards, called ‘49-State’ certified.”).
73 CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION, supra note 29.
74 NAT’L CONF. OF STATE LEG., supra note 3.
75 Section V.A, infra, addresses the constitutional implications of federal intrusion into
this traditionally state-regulated sphere.
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example will better illustrate the competing interests at stake and illumi-
nate how federal regulators may best implement their policy decisions
uniformly at the state level.76
Currently, the technological development surrounding V2V com-
munications and V2I communications poses the greatest emerging regula-
tory conundrum as the technologies threaten to privatize traffic control.77
To be sure, V2V and V2I communications are far from the only consider-
ations in a regulatory regime, but they are emblematic of the challenges
faced by the industry and will lead to a greater understanding of the
unique issues raised by the industry.
A. Vehicle-to-Vehicle Communication Considerations
As the name indicates, V2V communications “transmit basic safety
information between vehicles,” such as road conditions, upcoming ob-
stacles, traffic information, and emergency response data.78 Waze, Google
Maps, and Apple Maps are all primitive forms of this technology: they use
aggregated data on devices in motion to predict traffic conditions.79 Each
of these software programs estimates slowdowns and traffic jams by cal-
culating the average speed and number of devices on a roadway.80 V2V
promises to do the same, but with no human to interpret the data, and
with a much more robust stream of information.81 In addition to assess-
ing traffic conditions, V2V will allow vehicles to negotiate rights of way
and passing speeds independent of road infrastructure or human inter-
vention.82 With widespread adoption of V2V communication, driverless
vehicles will broadcast information about traffic hazards, road conditions,
weather conditions, blind corners, slowdowns, emergencies, and many
other factors to increase safety and convenience on the road.83
76 Ryan Beene, V2V Hits Critical Stage: Technology is ‘at the 1-yard line’ but faces polit-
ical obstacles, AUTOMOTIVE NEWS (May 15, 2016) (“[The] V2V mandate is viewed by policy
experts as the most important step for connected-car deployment.”).
77 Id. (“[T]he cable TV industry, plus Google, Qualcomm and a coalition of other groups,
urged the FCC to open the 5.9-gigahertz band of the radio spectrum.”).
78 NAT’L HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMIN, supra note 35, at xiii.
79 NCTA: THE INTERNET & TELEVISION ASSOCIATION, How Google Tracks Traffic (July 3,
2013), https://www.ncta.com/platform/broadband-internet/how-google-tracks-traffic/ [https://
perma.cc/M22H-M5RT].
80 Id.
81 NAT’L HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMIN., VEHICLE-TO-VEHICLE COMMUNICATIONS (2016),
https://icsw.nhtsa.gov/safercar/v2v/ [https://perma.cc/S493-N3XW].
82 U.S. DEP’T OF TRANSP., FACT SHEET, VEHICLE-TO-VEHICLE COMMUNICATION TECHNOL-
OGY (2014).
83 Id.
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B. Vehicle-to-Infrastructure Communication Considerations
Similar to V2V communication, V2I communication enables sig-
naling between vehicles and road infrastructure such as stoplights, vari-
able direction signage, speed limit signs, or road markings.84 As is already
implemented manually in many urban areas, V2I communication will
enable low-capacity multi-lane roads to automatically switch directions
of travel in response to fluctuating traffic conditions.85 V2I also allows for
variable speed limits depending on road conditions, time of day, or other
factors.86 As one example among many, school zones don’t need a twenty-
five-mile-per-hour speed limit at midnight, yet many jurisdictions enforce
the rule around the clock.87 Such adaptive road infrastructure enabled by
V2I will vastly improve optimization of traffic flows by fine-tuning all as-
pects of the road-going experience.88
IV. MAXIMIZING BENEFITS BY SELECTING AN APPROPRIATE
REGULATORY MODEL
Regulators can maximize the benefits of nascent technologies, such
as V2I and V2V, by selecting an appropriate regulatory model. As discussed
earlier, regulators must select from three potential regulatory models:
the private model, the public model, or the hybrid approach. Each involves
varying degrees of industry and government participation. Looking to other
industries and other areas of government, the U.S. government has histor-
ically adopted a wide variety of approaches. The following sections ex-
amine the competing merits of the private, public, and hybrid approaches
in the context of autonomous vehicles, ultimately recommending a hybrid
approach for its ease of administration and inherent fairness.
NHTSA has already begun to contemplate its role in the auton-
omous vehicle revolution. A 2011 government roundtable, attended by
84 Luigi Glielmo, Grand Challenges for Control: Vehicle-to-Vehicle/Vehicle-to-Infrastruc-
ture Control, INST. OF ELECTRICAL ENGINEERS CONTROL SYST. SOC’Y, http://www.ieeecss
.org/sites/ieeecss.org/files/documents/IoCT-Part4-13VehicleToVehicle-HR.pdf [https://perma
.cc/YBB4-9WKN] (last visited Jan. 21, 2018).
85 Id.
86 Id.
87 Gary Richards, Roadshow: Confusion over 25 mph speed limit near schools, MERCURY
NEWS, Feb. 13, 2015, http://www.mercurynews.com/2015/02/13/roadshow-confusion-over
-25-mph-speed-limit-near-schools/ [https://perma.cc/Z4FE-KNBU].
88 See generally NAT’L HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMIN., supra note 81.
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USDOT representatives discussed various industry trends and potential
regulatory models.89 NHTSA understands there is a question of regulatory
posturing that must be answered.90 At the roundtable, officials evaluated
the pure public model of regulation as used in the healthcare industry’s
complex tapestry of interwoven regulatory layers.91 NHTSA has refer-
enced the current state of healthcare’s regulatory affairs in its policy mem-
oranda, and regards it as a cautionary tale.92 As an intermediate approach,
the Telecom industry enjoys a large amount of independence in setting
districts and regulating coverage areas, while still attracting a moderate
amount of government oversight.93 NHTSA has begun the process of look-
ing for wisdom in other industries, but has not yet reached a conclusion.
A. The Private Model of V2I and V2V Regulation
In the private model of regulation, the government trusts the in-
dustry to self-regulate. This works well for lawyers, and poorly for invest-
ment banks.94 In the V2I and V2V context, a private regulatory model
would leave industry leadership free to determine the contours of the
communication standard: whether signals are sent on radar, LIDAR, in-
frared, or some other platform; the wavelength on which the signal is
sent; and the standards by which the signal is encoded.95
Standards selection has been a historic struggle in the tech world.
For instance, Apple pays large royalty fees to Sony Ericsson for its use
of the 2G, 3G, and 4G internet communication protocols—a standard cell
phone feature.96 The same monopolization phenomenon has occurred with
89 INTELLIGENT TRANSP. SYS., supra note 10, at 6 (examining “existing governance models
within the public sector and/or industry” for inspiration).
90 Id .at 6.
91 Id.
92 Id. at 11 (“[t]he organization over-engineered the standards and lost sight of the goals
of improving health.”).
93 See generally Nicholas Economides, Telecommunications Regulation: An Introduction,
NYU STERN (2005), http://www.stern.nyu.edu/networks/Economides_Telecommunications
_Regulation.pdf [https://perma.cc/A7P7-T4CN] (offering a succinct summary of the cur-
rent state of regulatory affairs in the telecom industry).
94 James E. Moliterno, The Trouble With Lawyer Regulation, 62 EMORY L.J. 101, 103 (2013)
(discussing the different cultures of regulation between lawyers and bankers and exam-
ining how culture affects ability to self-govern).
95 See Glielmo, supra note 84, at 2 (indicating Europe has settled on wireless LAN as a
protocol, but stating that American systems are “not yet compatible” with one another).
96 Peter Sayer, Apple to pay Ericsson patent royalties on iPhones and iPads, INFOWORLD
(Dec. 21, 2015), http://www.infoworld.com/article/3017534/intellectual-property/apple-to
-pay-ericsson-patent-royalties-on-iphones-and-ipads.html [https://perma.cc/V9C5-8ENN].
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Apple’s lightning ports,97 the Blu-ray disk format,98 and many other tech-
nological standards. The evidence is clear: the establisher of a technology
standard gains perpetual royalties from those that did not establish the
standard. This incentivizes holdouts and forestalls the emergence of a
clear standard, because the last company to give in gains a monopoly over
its competitors. Thus, in the private model of governance, a clear standard
may never emerge, and if one does, it will disproportionately favor the
last holdout and cause bullying or in-fighting in the industry. Especially
considering the public’s interest in a clear, royalty-free standard, the in-
dustry requires at least some modicum of federal intervention.
99
The royalty-seeking holdout problem becomes especially onerous
when considering the unique challenges facing driverless vehicle technol-
ogy. For example, in establishing a V2V communication protocol, the indus-
try must be able to guarantee that when an Apple iCar, a Google Waymo,
97 Jordan Kahn, Apple will soon let third-party products use its Lightning port, opening
up new possibilities for accessories, 9TO5 MAC (Nov. 18, 2014), https://9to5mac.com/2014
/11/18/apple-mfi-summit-third-party-products-lightning-port-new-accessories/ [https://
perma.cc/3YNV-SD6T].
98 Chen An Huang et al., Sony’s Blu-Ray Strategy, MCAFEE, http://www.mcafee.cc/Classes
/BEM106/Papers/2007/Bluray.pdf [https://perma.cc/7DY7-DEUM] (last visited Jan. 21,
2018) (“Only the largest manufacturers have bargaining power.”).
99 Standards, XKCD, https://xkcd.com/927/ [https://perma.cc/XC22-9PFA] (last visited
Jan. 21, 2018) (explaining the proliferation of standards and competitive pursuit of mo-
nopoly) (Graphic used with artist’s permission).
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and a Tesla all meet up at a three-way intersection, that all the parties in-
volved are speaking the same language and can navigate the turn without
incident.100 Whichever tech giant holds out the longest will compel use of
their technology as the standard.101 This impedes innovation and is exactly
the high-speed game of chicken that regulation should seek to alleviate.
Likewise, V2I systems are not immune from the fight for techno-
logical superiority. The best present-day analogue for V2I infrastructure
is the drive-through wireless toll-road payment program used by fast-
pass, ez-pass, and their equivalents.102 The system relies on dash-mounted
passes that are government-issued, government-standardized, and used
on government-maintained infrastructure.103 Even so, these passes still
fail on occasion, and any failure rate above zero is too high for V2I com-
munication events that impact public safety.104 A situation with compet-
ing standards is not conducive to reliability.105 In addition to toll payment
methods, these infrastructure-interface issues are also apparent in our
present reality in other ways.106 For example, luxury car owners frequently
have difficulty programming vehicle-based infrared garage door openers
to function with their particular garage door.107 Enabling third-party
infrastructure to seamlessly interface with a different third-party vehicle
is incredibly difficult absent some measure of paternalism.108 In the V2I
case, some measure of governmental interference is unavoidable, as the
infrastructure itself is inherently government-owned and -operated.109 This
rules out the private model entirely.
100 See Glielmo, supra note 84, at 2.
101 ANNE LAYNE-FARRAR, COMPETITION POLICY INTERNATIONAL’S NORTH AMERICA COLUMN,
WHY PATENT HOLDOUT IS NOT JUST A FANCY NAME FOR PLAIN OLD PATENT INFRINGEMENT
4 (2016) (“[h]oldout can be a very attractive strategy for standards implementers.”).
102 See, e.g., PA. TURNPIKE, How Does E-ZPass Work?, https://www.paturnpike.com/toll
/how_it_works.aspx [https://perma.cc/ZCD2-54EE].
103 Id.
104 E-ZPass Consumer Reviews and Complaints, CONSUMER AFFAIRS, https://www.con
sumeraffairs.com/utilities/ez_pass.html [https://perma.cc/7FN5-MA5M] (last visited Jan. 21,
2018) (listing several dozen complaints about malfunctioning EZpasses).
105 Glielmo, supra note 84, at 2.
106 See, e.g., Acura Technical Service Bulletin 04-036, Homelink® System—Won’t Learn
Garage Door Opener Code (Jan. 2005).
107 Id.
108 See, e.g., 47 C.F.R. § 2.106 (2002) (relying on the FCC’s regulatory enforcement au-
thority to allocate radio wave frequencies amongst broadcasters).
109 But see Steve H. Hanke, In Praise of Private Infrastructure, CATO INST. (Apr. 2008),
https://www.cato.org/publications/commentary/praise-private-infrastructure [https://perma
.cc/Z8ZG-2KGU] (examining ways to circumvent the “natural monopoly character” of pri-
vately owned infrastructure—but this potential future is not yet our reality).
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In addition to holdout and standardization problems, the private
governance model brings even worse economic problems in the form of
hidden costs. The private model of regulation creates strange implica-
tions for variable licensing fees. For example, luxury car brands with a
lower volume of sales have fewer units over which to amortize their costs,
so a fixed licensing fee upfront will cost more per unit for a low-volume
vehicle manufacturer than a high-volume vehicle manufacturer.110 Thus,
a low-volume brand like Mercedes will pay more per car to license tech-
nology than will a high-volume brand like Honda.111 Luxury brands in
general tend to overpay for their patent and licensing fees as compared
to mass-market brands.112 In effect, this will cause some consumers to pay
more to access infrastructure and other consumers to pay less. Norma-
tively, this may not be a negative consequence—perhaps some would like
to see the wealthy pay more for the use of common infrastructure. Disre-
garding normative claims to balancing class divides, this is a negative
externality for at least two reasons.
First, disparate royalty fees function as a hidden tax on vehicle
manufacturers that lack bargaining power against the owner of the tech-
nology standard. This is only exacerbated by the fact that the government
will have no view into the hidden costs of its infrastructure. If installing
a “smart light” at an intersection will incur a licensing fee for the users
of enabled vehicles, the government is blind to the amount of the func-
tional tax it levies on those companies that did not develop the tech-
nology standard and instead must license it.
Such a government-enforced monopoly may seem far-fetched; how-
ever, the rudiments of an analogous system are already present in Firm
Fixed Price federal government contracts whose terms require the use of
a specific software product.113 In most cases, the cost of the contract-man-
dated product skyrockets as the government contractor loses all leverage
110 Jason Lancaster, What Makes Luxury Cars So Expensive?, HUFFINGTON POST (Mar. 19,
2015), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/quora/what-makes-luxury-cars-so_b_6904266.html
[https://perma.cc/3EUP-EK89] (“The more exclusive (fewer models sold) the car, the more
the automaker has to charge each buyer for their design, development, and assembly costs.”).
111 Id.
112 Bruce M. Tharp, Product Licensing 101: So Let’s Talk Money, CORE77 (Sep. 11, 2012)
(“[m]ass retailers are often the key to a nice royalty check.”).
113 THE U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, COMPETITION AND MONOPOLY: SINGLE FIRM CONDUCT
UNDER SECTION 2 OF THE SHERMAN ACT 132 (June 25, 2015), available at https://www.jus
tice.gov/sites/default/files/atr/legacy/2008/09/12/236681_chapter8.pdf [https://perma.cc
/V6RG-JZJ3] (“Higher entry barriers make it easier for existing firms to exploit whatever
power they have to raise prices above the competitive level.”).
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against the software provider.114 In effect, the government has given a mo-
nopoly to the third-party software supplier in both cases.
Second, the profits of this system will accrue only to the largest
bully that holds out the longest.115 Promising a government-enforced mo-
nopoly to whoever can beat the industry into accepting a single standard
is a recipe for stagnation, or at least non-cooperation.116 These market and
game-theory forces combine to eliminate the private model of regulation
from serious consideration as a viable approach.
The failures of the private model of regulation have also borne out
in the emergent industries of the past as well. During the internet’s growth
phase in the early 1990s, the federal government took a complete hands-
off, private approach.117 This pure private model resulted in the private
sector’s creation of ICANN, the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names
and Numbers, to keep some semblance of order.118 Despite inventing the
internet and contributing greatly to its early growth, the U.S. Federal
Government still has only limited jurisdiction over even the most egregious
of internet crimes.119 Establishment of an unregulated quasigovernmental
organization, such as ICANN, over which the government has effectively
zero control hardly proves an aspirational model for the prudent gover-
nance of autonomous vehicles.120
B. The Public Model of V2I and V2V Regulation
With the elimination of the private regulatory model, two models
remain: the public model, or the public-private hybrid model. Both involve
some modicum of government interference in the research and development
114 Id.
115 LAYNE-FARRAR, supra note 101.
116 Id.
117 Avik Roy, Thanks To Bill Clinton, We Don’t Regulate the Internet Like a Public Utility,
FORBES (Mar. 17, 2014), http://www.forbes.com/sites/realspin/2014/03/17/thanks-to-bill
-clinton-we-don’t-regulate-the-internet-like-a-public-utility/#58f805fd34bb [https://perma
.cc/QJ8U-XD5E] (stating that the early U.S. internet regulatory efforts required “trusting
market forces and technological innovation to the maximum extent”).
118 See generally ICANN, https://www.icann.org/ [https://perma.cc/N88F-NX2V] (last vis-
ited Jan. 21, 2018) (“The Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers is the
private sector, non-profit corporation created in 1998 to assume responsibility for . . . sys-
tem management.”).
119 INTELLIGENT TRANSP. SYS., supra note 10, at 15 (“The Internet as a whole is not nec-
essarily a good model for Connected Vehicles . . . .”).
120 Id.
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of the technology. The nature of that interference will shape the growth
of the industry and merits its own discussion.
A closer examination reveals that the public model can exist only
in theory. Regulators must be apprised of the current state of the rapidly
changing technology, and they can learn only from the industry. A recent
Bloomberg report indicates that Silicon Valley currently spends twice as
much lobbying money as Wall Street.121 Even worse, the Google Trans-
parency Project reveals that the Obama administration hired 258 advis-
ers and analysts from Google alone.122 Lobbying efforts in the legislative
branch tend to be subtler and harder to track, but campaign contribu-
tions from the technology sector have increased more than forty percent
in the past eight years.123 When private sector actors hold office or sway
the legislature to adopt favorable changes, they remove the potential for
pure government regulation. In this political system, there can be no
such thing as action not directed by the industry. This leaves one viable
regulatory approach: the hybrid model.
C. The Hybrid Model of V2I and V2V Regulation
Up to this point, it is clear that regulation should seek to enhance
the benefits of driverless vehicles while minimizing the downside risk by
selecting an optimal option, or mixture of options, from the risk cube. Pol-
icymakers would be wise to look to past emergent markets and study the
mixtures of private influence, public influence, and industry influence on
the regulatory bodies that grew up with the industries.124 To USDOT’s
credit, focus groups engaged in roundtable discussions to seek wisdom
from the past growth of other industries prior to issuing its 2017 guid-
ance on driverless vehicles.125 As discussed earlier, allowing a regulatory
121 Saleha Mohsin, Silicon Valley Cozies Up to Washington, Outspending Wall Street 2–1,
BLOOMBERG (Oct. 18, 2016), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-10-18/out
spending-wall-street-2-to-1-silicon-valley-takes-washington [https://perma.cc/H4PF-AFCA].
122 GOOGLE TRANSPARENCY PROJECT, Google’s Revolving Door (US), https://googletrans
parencyproject.org/articles/googles-revolving-door-us [https://perma.cc/WX7L-M589] (last
visited Jan. 21, 2018).
123 David Sirota, Election 2016: Silicon Valley Becomes Major Money Force in Politics,
INT’L BUS. TIMES (July 16, 2015), http://www.ibtimes.com/election-2016-silicon-valley-be
comes-major-money-force-politics-2010988 [https://perma.cc/YU3D-JLZW].
124 INTELLIGENT TRANSP. SYS., supra note 10, at 1 (stating the mix of industries NHTSA
looks to for “best practices.”).
125 Id. (“[t]here is expertise in the area of governance for other industries.”).
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machine to grow organically and unpruned over time will only result in
holdouts, unpredictable licensing fees, and economic waste.126 In contrast
to the organic, private-sector approach, USDOT is examining approaches
such as the management of the telecom growth phase in the mid-1900s.127
These massive telecom companies grew in a segmented, planned way due
to the need for taxpayer-funded infrastructure.128 In this approach, the
federal government (and sometimes state governments) granted charters
to corporations to provide services and build infrastructure in compliance
with government-provided specifications using taxpayer money.129 The
idea of private, for-profit businesses commingling goals with the govern-
ment seems to be a promising analogy for the construction and operation
of V2I technology.130 The government retains authority and control, but
does not need to engage in the day-to-day management and operation
of cables and towers—or for autonomous vehicles, stoplights and tech-
enabled roadways.131
As with its cross-industry research into regulatory posture,132
NHTSA has also conducted research on potential model legislation to
accept or consider.133 Michigan, the country’s nucleus of automotive inno-
vation, has rapidly become the most autonomous-vehicle-friendly state
in the union.134 The University of Michigan has established a driverless
vehicle proving grounds, and has successfully lobbied the state to relax
regulations on autonomous vehicles, allowing the car-manufacturing pow-
erhouse to attract more manufacturing and research and development
jobs.135 Specific features of Michigan’s regulatory regime are difficult to
126 See infra Introduction.
127 INTELLIGENT TRANSP. SYS., supra note 10, at 7.
128 U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY OFFICE OF ECON. POL’Y, EXPANDING OUR NATION’S
INFRASTRUCTURE THROUGH INNOVATIVE FINANCING 2 (2014) (stating “Our nation needs
to continually modernize and maintain our infrastructure,” and emphasizing that busi-
nesses “need reliable power and broadband.”).
129 Id.
130 Hanke, supra note 109.
131 Id.
132 INTELLIGENT TRANSP. SYS., supra note 10, at 1.
133 Alex Davies, The Feds Just Got Real About Self-Driving Cars (It’s About Time), WIRED
(Sept. 9, 2016.), https://www.wired.com/2016/09/feds-just-got-real-self-driving-cars-time/
[https://perma.cc/Z2ZH-Y3BL].
134 See Kirsten Korosec, Michigan Just Passed the Most Permissive Self-Driving Car Laws
in the Country, FORTUNE (Dec. 9, 2016), http://fortune.com/2016/12/09/michigan-self-driv
ing-cars [https://perma.cc/PR4W-VK5U]
135 Neal E. Boudette, Michigan’s New Motor City: Ann Arbor as a Driverless-Car Hub,
N.Y. TIMES (July 9, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/07/09/business/driverless-car
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analyze—because they are relatively new.136 Michigan’s Vehicle Code was
amended in December 2016 to include the content of Michigan Senate
Bills 0995–0998, which, among other things, provide for “Research or
testing of automated motor vehicle[s], technology allowing motor vehi-
cle[s] to operate without human operator, or any automated driving sys-
tem . . . .”137 However, in the short term, the hybrid approach may require
allowing industry to take the lead, as private industry can experiment
more quickly and with less risk than the government.
V. THE POWER TO REGULATE
Determining an appropriate regulatory posture and a well-planned
approach means little without sufficient authority and funding to imple-
ment the plan. The following sections establish federal regulators’ power
to act, and identify potential sources and amounts of funding.
A. Constitutionality Considerations
Federal intrusion into state vehicle codes implicates constitutional
and states’ rights issues that merit discussion. The federal government has
mandated vehicle regulations in the past, such as the Nixon-era Emergency
Highway Energy Conservation Act creating a national speed limit of fifty-
five miles per hour,138 or the Energy Policy and Conservation Act’s Cor-
porate Average Fuel Economy (“CAFE”) standards mandating fleet fuel
economy minimums.139 These regulations are typically predicated on Con-
gress’s commerce clause power, and current constitutional jurisprudence
accords Congress with a large amount of deference when regulating chan-
nels of interstate commerce (such as highways)140 and instrumentalities
of interstate commerce (such as cars).141 Indeed, the Ninth Circuit has
-autonomous-university-michigan.html [https://web.archive.org/web/*/https://www.nytimes
.com/2017/07/09/business/driverless-car-autonomous-university-michigan.html].
136 Melissa Burden, Snyder Signs New Michigan Self-Driving Vehicles Law, THE DETROIT
NEWS (Dec. 9, 2016), http://www.detroitnews.com/story/business/autos/2016/12/09/auton
omous-car-law/95199544/ [https://perma.cc/5GL5-MQU5].
137 Michigan Vehicle Code, MCL 257.665.
138 Emergency Highway Energy Conservation Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-239, 87 Stat. 1046.
139 49 U.S.C. § 32902 (2007).
140 See, e.g., Houston, E. & W. Tex. R. Co. v. United States, 234 U.S. 342, 345 (1914).
141 Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251, 272 (1918) (“Over interstate transportation, or
its incidents, the regulatory power of Congress is ample.”).
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weighed in on the permissibility of federal regulation of emission stan-
dards and has found no overreach.142 A similar finding is likely in the reg-
ulation of autonomous vehicle standards.
B. Funding Considerations
1. The Availability of Funding
Congress surely has the power to regulate autonomous vehicles, but
funding is another matter.143 Historically, funds expended by the USDOT
to maintain federal highways and fund the NHTSA have been raised
through federal gasoline taxes accumulating in the national Highway Trust
Fund.144 Special assessments and discrete projects have been funded from
this account in the past, such as the Leaking Underground Storage Tank
Trust Fund.145 Due to reorganization of the trust fund accounts and a dis-
bursement from the General Fund to repair infrastructure, the Highway
Trust Fund started Fiscal Year 2017 at a 470 percent premium above stan-
dard operating levels.146 Given the current high level of infrastructure
funding in combination with the well-established mechanisms for special
projects, Congress and the USDOT should have little trouble allocating
funding for the creation of an autonomous vehicle regulatory regime.147
2. The Amount of Funding Required
However, ability to allocate funding does not alone advance the
USDOT mission.148 To effect true change through V2I technology, USDOT
must allocate sufficient funding to retrofit or otherwise update a substan-
tial amount of the country’s road infrastructure.149 Although stoplights
are not the only infrastructure in need of modernization, they are among
142 Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. Nat’l Highway Traffic Safety Admin., 538 F.3d 1172
(9th Cir. 2008) (recognizing and upholding NHTSA power to enforce emission standards).
143 See Federal-Aid Highways Act, 23 U.S.C. §§ 101–81 (1956) (providing funding mech-
anisms for highway maintenance and construction).
144 Id.
145 42 U.S.C. § 9608 (1986).
146 U.S. DEP’T OF TRANSP. FED. HIGHWAY ADMIN., STATUS OF THE HIGHWAY TRUST FUND
(2017), http://www.fhwa.dot.gov/highwaytrustfund/ [https://perma.cc/795H-D6B2].
147 Id.
148 Federal-Aid Highways Act, 23 U.S.C. §§ 101(a)(3) (1956) (recognizing the need for “in-
tegrated strategies” to optimize “cross-jurisdictional systems”).
149 Congress has recognized this as a policy goal. See id. § 101(b)(3)(H) (directing the
Secretary of Transportation to “meet the needs of the 21st Century”).
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the most easily researched and understood elements of roadway infra-
structure and serve as an apt example to estimate the potential costs of
required improvements.
According to a 2012 report by the National Transportation Opera-
tions Coalition, the U.S. has 311,000 stoplights on its roadways, consti-
tuting an $83.7 billion public investment.150 Currently, states, counties,
and localities fund the purchase, installation, and maintenance of these
assets.151 These local funding sources spend approximately $3,000 per
year per stoplight on maintenance and upgrades.152 It is not feasible for
the federal government to retrofit and assume operation and mainte-
nance of all 311,000 of these stoplights.153 However, update efforts need
not focus on all stoplights all at once. In fact, 72,000 of our country’s stop-
lights are already “coordinated traffic signals,” meaning they report back
to a central computing system in the city and are programmable.154 To
enable V2I communication, these already “smart” stoplights would only
require minimal retrofitting to add a sensor capable of communicating
via the protocols decided by regulators and the industry. Even better,
these “smart” lights tend to be concentrated in urban areas—areas most
likely to benefit from V2I-enabled infrastructure.155
Targeting these 72,000 “smart” lights for initial upgrade, poten-
tial costs become markedly more manageable. Purchase, siting, and in-
stallation of a typical traffic signal costs approximately $150,000.156 This
means that these 72,000 lights represent a public investment of a little
less than $11 billion.157 Although seemingly a large figure, USDOT’s 2016
150 NAT’L TRANSP. OPERATIONS COAL., NATIONAL SIGNAL REPORT CARD TECHNICAL REPORT
3 (2012), http://library.ite.org/pub/e265477a-2354-d714-5147-870dfac0e294 [https://perma
.cc/5T8Q-XQ7U].
151 Id. (“Traffic signals are owned and operated by State, county, and local transportation
and public works agencies.”).
152 Id. at 9, Table 5.
153 See U.S. DEP’T OF TRANSP. OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SEC’Y FOR RESEARCH AND TECH.,
FROM THE NATIONAL TRAFFIC SIGNAL REPORT CARD: COSTS TO UPDATE SIGNAL TIMING IS
$3,000 PER INTERSECTION (2005), http://www.itscosts.its.dot.gov/ITS/benecost.nsf/ID/215
F723DB93D293C8525725F00786FD8?OpenDocument&Query=CApp [https://perma.cc
/MY25-AG97] (stating that one technician can maintain thirty to forty stoplights, creat-
ing a need for eight thousand full-time employees to maintain the nation’s stoplights).
154 NAT’L TRANSP. OPERATIONS COAL., supra note 150, at Table 1.
155 Id. at 31 (using coordinated lights to maximize “performance in metropolitan areas”).
156 See, e.g., INST. OF TRANSP. ENGINEERS GEORGIA SECTION TECHNICAL COMM. GRP.,
TRAFFIC SIGNALS PUBLIC INFORMATION DOCUMENT 9 (2011), http://www.dot.ga.gov/Drive
Smart/SafetyOperation/Documents/TrafficSignals/Public%20Information/TrafficSignals
-PID.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZU6F-VHWB].
157 $150,000 x 72,000 = $10.8 billion.
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transportation projects dwarf such an expenditure.158 Furthermore, ret-
rofitting and updating these targeted lights would not require the expen-
sive siting, surveying, and environmental approvals necessary to initially
install the larger hardware components, so retrofit costs are likely far
less than the current investment.
The USDOT estimates the current national average cost of a stop-
light control computer at approximately $10,000, plus $3,000 for installa-
tion and programming.159 This estimate is per intersection, so three- and
four-way intersections further reduce the per-unit cost.160 Thus, at the
most, the total public investment in the control systems for all targeted
72,000 stop lights is $936 million.161 Such an investment is small enough
to be a rounding error on the USDOT’s 2017 budget of $98.1 billion.162
Although the technology for V2I has yet to reach mass-market produc-
tion scale, costs are likely to mirror existing solutions, as computer tech-
nology has fallen substantially in recent years and a V2I controller only
differs from a standard “smart” controller by the addition of a few sen-
sors.163 Starting with a targeted set of urban stoplights and then eventu-
ally moving to more advanced V2I infrastructure, such as speed limit
signalers or road direction switching, seems a plausible phased rollout
for the future road ahead.164
CONCLUSION
The advent of autonomous vehicles promises to bring many bene-
fits to society at large, but successful integration and use of this technology
158 See, e.g., Eric Jaffe, The Big U.S. Transportation Projects to Watch in 2016, CITYLAB
(Dec. 22, 2015), http://www.citylab.com/commute/2015/12/us-infrastructure-projects-2016
-transportation/421431/ [https://perma.cc/A5NN-YW3G] (discussing a $20 billion railway
project in New Jersey, a $17 billion Panama Canal expansion, and other similarly sized
projects).
159 U.S. DEP’T OF TRANSP. OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SEC’Y FOR RESEARCH AND TECH.,
supra note 153.
160 Id.
161 72,000 x $13,000 = $936 million.
162 U.S. DEP’T OF TRANSP., BUDGET HIGHLIGHTS 7 (2017), https://www.transportation.gov
/sites/dot.gov/files/docs/DOT_BH2017_508%5B2%5D.pdf [https://perma.cc/RUN3-DVLN].
163 Matt Rosoff, Every type of tech product has gotten cheaper over the last two decades,
BUSINESS INSIDER (Oct. 14, 2015), http://www.businessinsider.com/historical-price-trends
-for-tech-products-2015-10 [https://perma.cc/E2BX-ABRS] (noting an almost 100% de-
crease in the cost of computer hardware since 1997).
164 U.S. DEP’T OF TRANSP. OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SEC’Y FOR RESEARCH AND TECH.,
supra note 153 (scheduling rolling updates to refresh all traffic controller computers every
ten years and indirectly providing the maximum time for which all stoplights in the U.S. are
upgraded to V2I technology once widely adopted).
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lies in the hands of regulators who have the power to either enhance or
destroy these advances. If properly implemented and not stifled with ex-
cessive regulation, autonomous vehicles promise to redesign our cities, pro-
duce large gains for the economy, and prevent millions of fatal accidents.
To fully realize these benefits, policymakers must carefully weigh
the risks and rewards of this new technology before acting. Once thor-
oughly informed as to all risks, regulators must select a regulatory model
with which to address the risks. Using this model, regulators must po-
sition all risks at the desired position on the risk cube, deciding whether
to accept, reject, mitigate, or transfer each risk inherent in the rise of
autonomous vehicles. For the purposes of consistency, a federally stan-
dardized autonomous vehicle code will provide the best tool by which
regulators may administer the policies they deem proper. When three
driverless cars come to an autonomous intersection, they will pass through
safely, but it is up to the regulators to determine how that happens, and
who profits the most.

